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Summary: The article examines the role of the ECJ in the balancing of 
fundamental rights within the EU legal order. In particular, it reflects 
on the consequences of the pronouncements of the Court of Justice 
in the Promusicae and Satamedia cases in the field of data protec-
tion. It argues that the ‘deferential approach’ adopted by the Court 
might affect the coherence of the internal market and fundamental 
freedoms. More importantly, it contends that it might also have nega-
tive implications for the equivalent protection of fundamental rights 
within the EU legal order. The article goes on to discuss the role that 
the Court of Justice, as the constitutional court of the EU, should play 
when ‘tough constitutional questions’, such as the balancing of funda-
mental rights, is at stake.
1. Introduction
The balancing by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (now: the Court 
of Justice of the European Union) of fundamental freedoms,1 on the one 
hand, and fundamental rights2 on the other, has for years now been at 
the heart of academic debate.3 Prominent cases such as Schmidberger,4 
1 The term ‘fundamental freedoms’ refers to the free movement of goods, services, capital 
and persons, the pillars for the establishment of the common market. See C Kombos, ‘Fun-
damental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A Symbiosis on the Basis of Subsidiarity’ 
(2006) 12 European Public Law 433, 435. For a general overview, see inter alia D Wyatt and 
A Dashwood, European Union Law (5th edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) 535 subseq; C 
Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU - The Four Freedoms (OUP, Oxford 2004).
2 The term ‘fundamental rights’ refers to the rights and principles enshrined in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR and which result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States. See Articles 6 (1) and (3) TEU.
3 See inter alia G de Burca, ‘The Language of Rights and European Integration’ in J Shaw 
and G More (eds) New Legal Dynamics of European Integration (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1995) 29; J Weiler and N Lockhart, ‘Taking Rights Seriously: The European Court and its 
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’ (1995) 32 CMLR 51 and 579; F Jakobs, ‘Human Rights 
in the European Union: The Role of the Court of Justice’ (2001) ELRev 331; B de Witte, ‘The 
Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’ 
in P Alston (ed) The EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999) 859. 
4 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659.
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Omega,5 Viking6 and Laval7 have been discussed vigorously in the litera-
ture and despite a number of nuances over the years, one can no longer 
seriously question whether the Court ‘is taking rights seriously’.8
However, new causes of concern seem to have appeared recently. 
This time, though, the problem does not arise when fundamental rights 
meet fundamental freedoms, but rather when the Court is engaged in a 
balancing exercise between fundamental rights themselves. The right to 
privacy is the ideal vehicle for exploring this tension between fundamen-
tal rights. This is because this right clashes routinely with other rights 
such as the right to property or the freedom of expression. How has the 
constitutional Court of the European legal order dealt with such cases 
of ‘tough constitutional questions’ when the balancing of fundamental 
rights is at stake? 
When asked to strike a fair balance between fundamental rights in 
the cases of Promusicae9 and Satamedia,10 the Court refused to provide a 
clear answer and returned the issue to the Member States. The present 
article considers this case law and attempts to draw out the implications 
for the internal market and for the standards of protection of fundamen-
tal rights themselves. While it does not dispute the motives and the good 
intentions of the ECJ, it nevertheless criticises the Court for failing to 
properly foresee the consequences of its rulings. It will be argued that by 
sending matters back to the national courts, the ECJ might in effect have 
endangered the coherence of the internal market and, what is even worse, 
undermined the equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights in 
the enlarged EU.
The analysis will proceed as follows. First, it will start by exami-
ning the Data Protection Directive,11 which is depicted as a paradigm 
of successful co-existence between fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms (Part 2). In this area, the ECJ will be praised for interpreting an 
5 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH  [2004] ECR I- 
9609.
6 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779.
7 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR 
I-11767. 
8 J Coppel and A O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’ (1992) 
29 CMLR, 669.
9 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España 
SAU, Judgment of 29 January 2008.
10 Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, Judgment of 16 December 
2008.
11 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, OJ L281 of 23 November 1995, p 31.
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internal market instrument in such a way that fosters the protection of 
a fundamental right. It will then turn to assess the recent case law of the 
Court concerning the balancing of fundamental rights in the Promusicae 
and Satamedia cases (Part 3). After this, it will attempt to explore the 
challenges posed by this case law to the internal market and fundamen-
tal rights (Part 4). Based on this analysis, the last section (Part 5) will 
argue against a deferential approach when the balancing of fundamental 
rights is at stake and will try to advance a number of normative argu-
ments concerning the role that a constitutional court, such as the Court 
of Justice, should play in such cases.
2. The data protection paradigm or when fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms can live in harmony with each other
2.1 The Data Protection Directive: a ‘successful marriage’ of funda-
mental rights and freedoms in the EU
2.1.1 Background to the adoption of the Data Protection Directive
Directive 95/46/EC12 (the ‘Data Protection Directive’) constitutes the 
central legislative measure of the EU data protection regime. It is the first 
piece of legislation adopted at the EU level concerning the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, and it is still 
considered to be the most important data protection initiative within the 
EU13, and ‘the leading force of globalizing data protection’14 in the rest of 
the world.
The negotiations for the adoption of the Data Protection Directive, 
which took almost five years to complete, provide a good example of the 
clash between fundamental rights on the one hand, and fundamental 
freedoms on the other. This was reflected in the approaches adopted by 
the three main actors involved in the Community’s legislative process: 
the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament.15 In particu-
lar, while the European Parliament had adopted as early as the 1970s a 
clear ‘fundamental human rights approach’,16 the Council and the Com-
mission seemed more concerned with ‘the promotion of a European data 
12 Directive 95/46/EC (n 11).
13 L Bygrave, ‘International Agreements to Protect Personal Data’ in JB Rule and G Greenleaf 
(eds), Global Privacy Protection - The First Generation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) 15, 31.
14  M Birnhack, ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime’ (2008) 24 
Computer Law & Security Report, 508, 512.
15 A Newman, discusses the role of data privacy authorities in the adoption of the Direc-
tive in ‘Building Transnational Civil Liberties: Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the 
European Data Privacy Directive’ (2008) 62 International Organization, 103, 119. 
16 D Heisenberg, Negotiating Privacy: the European Union, the United States and Personal 
Data Protection (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2005) 53; D Campbell (ed) Data Trans-
mission and Privacy (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1994) 150.
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processing industry’17 and the facilitation of transborder data flows. The 
European Parliament had asked the Commission three times (in 1976, 
1979, and 1982) to propose a directive in order to harmonise data pro-
tection regulations across the EC. The Commission only provided a first 
draft of a directive harmonising data protection legislation in 1990. This 
draft was largely inspired by the German and French data protection 
laws, and thus had fundamental rights as its central focus. What has 
been characterised by one author18 as ‘Germany’s disproportionate in-
fluence’ on this first Commission draft was mainly a consequence of the 
significant contribution of Hesse’s data protection commissioner, Spiros 
Simitis, who acted as the Chairman of the Commission’s drafting group. 
Simitis, who also held the Chair of the Council of Europe’s Data Protec-
tion Experts Committee, was keen to emphasise that the fundamental 
human rights aspect of the Directive could not be traded off against other 
interests.19 It is hardly surprising that this position was not welcomed by 
certain Member States within the Council, in particular the UK, which 
did not see any need for the harmonisation of data protection rules at the 
EC level. Furthermore, the Commission’s proposal was severely criticised 
by trade and industry on the grounds that it was too bureaucratic and 
gave a clear priority to the protection of personal data at the expense of 
other objectives such as the need for the commercial exchange of data.20
In view of these criticisms, the Commission submitted a second 
amended draft in October 1992. The tensions within the Council betwe-
en the different Member States were obvious even after this second pro-
posal. The UK continued to object to a directive that would harmonise 
data protection laws in Europe to a higher degree than the UK standard. 
However, in the end it chose to abstain rather than vote against the Di-
17 A Nugter, Transborder Flow of Personal Data within the EC (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, Boston 1990) 32.
18 Heisenberg (n 16) 55.
19 ‘While the traditional four freedoms may still play a crucial role, the Union’s explicit 
commitment to the fundamentals of a democratic society entails the duty to respect the 
basic rights of its citizens. Indeed, the Member States, rather than simply relying on the 
decisions of the European Court, stressed the importance of these rights and the necessity 
of safeguarding them in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Against this background, the Commission not only paved the way for a Directive, but also 
expressly declared its 1990 proposals to be an immediate consequence of the European 
Community’s duty to guarantee the fundamental rights of its citizens.
The Commission’s change of position has … far-reaching consequences … The Commission 
… must give a clear preference to a regulatory scheme that best secures the protection of 
the individuals concerned. In other words, the commitment to fundamental rights forces 
the Commission to achieve not merely some level of protection, but protection of “a high 
degree,” which in the Union’s language means the maximum possible.’ S Simitis, ‘From the 
Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection of Personal Data’, (1995) 80 (3) Iowa 
Law Review 440, 447-448.
20 The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations in Europe (UNICE) stated in 
March 1991 its objections to the Directive, claiming it would potentially lead to ‘a fortress 
Europe’ by cutting off data flow to countries that did not have as strict data protection laws. 
See Tech Europe, 1 March 1991.
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rective. The Directive was finally signed by the Presidents of the Council 
and the European Parliament on 24 October 1995, giving Member States 
a period of three years for transposition into domestic law.21
2.1.2 Objectives and legal basis
The Data Protection Directive aims to harmonise the different natio-
nal rules on the protection of personal data by simultaneously ensuring 
the free movement of such data. In this respect, it can be seen on the one 
hand as a ‘negative harmonisation’ instrument to the extent that it in-
tends to remove obstacles to the establishment of the internal market by 
ensuring and facilitating the free trade of data between different Member 
States. However, on the other hand, it can be considered as a measure of 
‘positive harmonisation’ in that it replaces the divergent data protection 
regimes across the Community with a harmonised EC regulatory fra-
mework which establishes a high level of protection of personal data. To 
this end, Recital 3 of the Directive states that 
… the establishment and functioning of an internal market in which 
… the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured require not only that personal data should be able to flow 
freely from one Member State to another, but also that the funda-
mental rights of individuals should be safeguarded. 
This linking by the Directive of the two seemingly conflicting prin-
ciples of free trade and data protection was not immune from criticism 
both from the point of view of fundamental rights protection and also 
from the standpoint of business interests. The major concern regarding 
fundamental rights was whether the protection of the right to privacy 
and of personal data was in fact totally subordinate to internal market 
prerogatives. One commentator did not hesitate to characterise the Com-
mission as a ‘European Midas’ in that everything it touches becomes a 
market.22 On the other hand, concerns about the need to establish a fun-
damental right to privacy and data protection at the EU level were (and 
still are) also voiced.23 According to one author, the EU data protection 
regime imposes an onerous set of requirements on all sectors of industry, 
21 All Member States have implemented Directive 95/46 in their national legislation. See 
‘Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to the Processing of Personal Data’, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
privacy/law/implementation_en.htm> accessed 10.05.2010.
22 S Gutwirth, Privacy and the Information Age (Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford 2002) 91-92.
23 See for instance L Bergkamp, ‘EU Data Protection Policy - The Privacy Fallacy: Adverse 
Effects of Europe’s Data Protection Policy in an Information-Driven Economy’ (2002) 18 
Computer Law & Security Report 31, 33. Bergkamp notes that ‘Data protection as currently 
conceived by the EU is a fallacy. It is a shotgun remedy against an incompletely conceptual-
ized problem. It is an emotional, rather than rational reaction to feelings of discomfort with 
expanding data flows. The EU regime is not supported by any empirical data on privacy 
risks and demand’.
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from financial institutions to consumer goods companies, and from list 
brokers to employers. 24
 The present paper does not intend to dwell further on the analysis 
of potential tensions between the right to data protection and the fun-
damental freedoms of the internal market. However, two points should 
be advanced here. First of all, after more than fifteen years of the Data 
Protection Directive, where the right to privacy and fundamental free-
doms seemed to have co-existed in harmony, the criticisms above appear 
rather unsubstantiated. Secondly, an important development that took 
place in EU primary constitutional law, and which has its roots in the 
Data Protection Directive itself, should not go unnoticed. This regards the 
enshrining of the right to data protection as an autonomous fundamental 
right in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR).25 Until recently, 
the right to personal data protection (or the right to ‘informational self-
determination’) was considered to be an aspect of the right to privacy.26 
However, the protection of personal data at the EU level is now conceived 
of as featuring an autonomous fundamental right distinct from the right 
to respect for private and family life,27 since it is specifically enshrined as 
a fundamental right in Article 8 of the EUCFR. 28
24 Bergkamp (n 23, 37) also observes that ‘EU policy … is driven by paternalistic motives; 
individuals need to be protected and be given inalienable but vague fundamental rights, the 
scope of which government officials define ex post in specific cases’.
25 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union proclaimed on 7 December 
2000 in Nice (OJ C 364/1). 
26  Privacy and data protection are not identical rights. While data protection is generally 
considered as an aspect of the right to privacy, it is however to be distinguished from it, since 
it applies to all personal data and is not limited to data related to the private or family life of 
a person. Data protection is defined in Article 1 of the 1981 Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (also known as ‘Convention 
108’) as the protection of the right to privacy of the individual ‘with regard to automatic pro-
cessing of personal data relating to him’. In fact, data protection rules are frequently justified 
and explained as an attempt to counter the perceived threat to informational privacy as a 
consequence of the increased use of computers and other processing means in the contem-
porary information society. See Tzanou ‘Data Protection in EU Law: An overview of the Legal 
Instruments’ in C Akrivopoulou,and A Psygkas (eds) Personal Data Privacy and Protection in a 
Surveillance Era: Technologies and Practices (IGI Global, Hershey) forthcoming.
27 N Skandamis, F Sigalas and S Stratakis, ‘Rival Freedoms in Terms of Security: The Case 
of Data Protection and the Criterion of Connexity’, Research Paper No 7, December 2007, 5. 
Available at <http://www.ceps.eu>. 
28 Article 8 EUCFR reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent 
of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority’.
See also the Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, EU Network of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, June 2006, available at 
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Turning now to the legal basis of the Data Protection Directive, it 
was adopted under Article 95 of the EC Treaty (now 114 TFEU), which 
concerns the approximation of legislation relating to the internal market. 
According to Recital 7 of the Directive:
… the difference in levels of protection of the rights … to privacy, 
with regard to the processing of personal data afforded in the diffe-
rent Member States may prevent the transmission of such data from 
the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State; … 
this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of 
a number of economic activities at Community level, distort competi-
tion and impede authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities 
under Community law. 
It is thus very interesting to note that the Directive was intended as 
a harmonisation instrument, which by establishing an equivalent level 
of protection of personal data would allow for their free movement in the 
internal market. However, it should be mentioned here that the Directive 
did not intend to establish merely a certain level of equivalent protection 
of the right to privacy within the Community, but protection of a ‘high’ 
degree.29 
Against this background, this article argues that the right to privacy, 
in particular data protection, and the fundamental freedoms of the in-
ternal market have succeeded in living together harmoniously under the 
auspices of the Data Protection Directive. However, this would have been 
impossible without the generous interpretation of this measure by the 
Court of Justice, which will be analysed in the following section.
2.2 Interpreting an internal market measure to foster the protecti-
on of fundamental rights: The case law of the Court of Justice on 
data protection
If we attempt a general comment on the ECJ’s reading of the Data 
Protection Directive, this would be that the Court, in essence, has inter-
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/rights/charter/docs/network_commentary_
final%20_180706.pdf > accessed 13.11.2010. The enshrining of the right to data protection 
as a fundamental right within the European legal order is not free from criticism. L Berg-
kamp (n 24, 31, 33) argues that: ‘An unfortunate consequence of including this right among 
truly fundamental rights, such as the prohibition of torture and slavery and the freedom 
of expression, is that the notion of fundamental right seriously devaluates, with adverse 
consequences for the respect for the core human rights’.
29 Recital 10 of the Data Protection Directive states: ‘… the object of the national laws on 
the processing of personal data is to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the 
right to privacy, which is recognised both in Article 8 the ECHR and the general principles of 
Community law; whereas, for that reason, the approximation of those laws must not result 
in any lessening of the protection they afford, but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a 
high level of protection in the Community’. (emphasis added)
60 Maria Tzanou: Balancing Fundamental Rights: United in Diversity? ...
preted an internal market harmonisation instrument (the Directive) in 
a manner that fosters the protection of a fundamental right within the 
Community.30 In this respect, it has adopted an expansive reading of 
the protective scope of the Directive which goes beyond the exercise of 
economic activities, and a restrictive one concerning the exemptions not 
covered by it. 
This flexible interpretation of the Directive is best illustrated in two 
important cases of the jurisprudence of the Court concerning the scope of 
application of the Data Protection Directive. Österreichischer Rundfunk31 
was a preliminary ruling case which concerned the compatibility with 
Community law of an Austrian provision requiring entities which were 
subject to control by the Austrian Court of Auditors, the Rechnungshof, 
to inform the latter of the salaries of their employees when they excee-
ded a certain level. Subsequently, the Rechnungshof would publish this 
information in a report which contained the names of the persons and 
the level of their respective salaries. In this case, the Court was asked to 
rule whether the Data Protection Directive was applicable at all to this 
control activity exercised by the Rechnungshof. Unlike Advocate General 
Tizzano, who pleaded against the applicability of the Directive, the ECJ 
found that it was applicable. According to the Court, ‘since any personal 
data can move between Member States, Directive 95/46 requires in prin-
ciple compliance with the rules for protection of such data with respect 
to any processing of data as defined by Article 3’.32 The ECJ rejected 
the argument that the Data Protection Directive applies only to activities 
which have a sufficient connection with the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms of the common market by holding that recourse to Article 95 
EC as a legal basis ‘does not presuppose the existence of an actual link 
with free movement between Member States in every situation referred to 
by the measure founded on that basis’.33 If a contrary interpretation had 
been adopted, it would have made the limits of the field of application of 
30 Tzanou (n 26). As the Data Protection Supervisor P Hustinx points out: ‘Data protection 
is more and more considered as a “horizontal” issue of a wider relevance than the well being 
of the internal market’. See P Hustinx, ‘Data Protection in the EU’ (2005) P&1, 62, 64.
31  Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 & C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk, Judgment 
of 20 May 2003, Full Court, [2003] ECR I-4989. 
32 Österreichischer Rundfunk (n 31) para 40. 
33 Österreichischer Rundfunk (n 31) para 41 (emphasis added). Classen (CD Classen, (case 
note) [2004] 41 CMLR, 1377, 1382) argues that: ‘But it is, above all, questionable … [that 
the Court] took no account of the limits of the legal basis in the Treaty when dealing with 
the question how to define the scope of a provision of secondary legislation. Article 95 EC is 
not a sufficient legal basis for a Directive applying within the whole scope of Community law. 
The Court of Justice did not even try to find any relation to the internal market beyond the 
realization of fundamental freedoms … the present decision is particularly disappointing. 
Certainly it proves the increasing interest of the ECJ in human rights questions, but this does 
not exonerate the Court from the obligation to examine the applicability of Community law – a 
criticism which can be addressed also towards some other recent judgments.’
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the Data Protection Directive particularly unsure and uncertain, which 
would have been contrary to its essential objective, which is the harmo-
nisation of the data protection rules of the Member States in order to eli-
minate obstacles and ensure the free movement of personal data within 
the internal market.34 
The same wide interpretation of the scope of the Data Protection 
Directive was reiterated in Lindqvist.35 Before moving to the reasoning of 
the Court, it is worth taking a closer look at the Opinion of the Advocate 
General. In particular, Advocate General Tizzano reasoned against the 
applicability of the Data Protection Directive to the processing of per-
sonal data that consisted of setting up an internet page as an ancillary 
activity to Mrs Lindqvist’s voluntary work as a catechist in a parish of the 
Swedish Protestant Church. To refute the Commission’s argument that 
Mrs Lindqvist’s activity fell within the scope of the Directive, as it was 
not confined to the pursuit of economic objectives but also had objecti-
ves connected with social imperatives and the protection of fundamental 
rights, the Advocate General observed that the need to safeguard the 
fundamental rights of individuals in order to ensure a high level of pro-
tection of these rights ‘was conceived in the course of and with a view to 
achieving the main objective of the Directive, namely the free movement of 
personal data inasmuch as it is held to be “vital to the internal market”’.36 
According to the Advocate General, contributing to economic and social 
progress and safeguarding fundamental rights represent important valu-
es and imperatives which the Community legislature took into account in 
framing the harmonised rules required for the establishment and functi-
oning of the internal market, but they are not independent objectives of 
the Directive.37 In accordance with its legal basis, Directive 95/46 has, 
in the view of the Advocate General, as its principal objective the guaran-
teeing of the free movement of data within the internal market. Thus, the 
harmonisation of national legislation on the protection of personal data is 
only a means of guaranteeing free movement of personal data. This me-
ans that, although it calls upon the Member States to adopt a harmoni-
sed system of protection of personal data, the Directive is not a norm for 
the protection of fundamental rights. To support this analysis, Advocate 
General Tizzano adopted a strict reading of the principle of ‘attributed 
competences’ and recalled that the European Community does not have 
any general competence to design provisions protecting fundamental 
rights. On the basis of Article 95 EC, the Community legislature did not 
34 Österreichischer Rundfunk (n 31) para 42.
35 Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971. L Coudray, (case note) [2004] 41 
CMLR, 1361. 
36 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist, 19 September 
2002, para 40.
37 Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano (n 36) para 41.
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have the competence to design an act guaranteeing, in all cases, the pro-
tection of fundamental rights. Thus, far from offering general protection 
to individuals, the Directive, according to the Advocate General, applies 
only to activities within the scope of Community law.
The Court of Justice did not adopt this approach. It stressed once 
more that a distinction should be made between the general objective of 
an act adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC and the specific situations 
where this act can be applied, even if these are not directly linked to the 
internal market. The ECJ clarified that the exception of Article 3 (2)38 
applies only to the activities which are expressly listed therein or which 
can be classified in the same category. As a result, the Directive applies 
to all other activities regardless of their connection with the internal mar-
ket. Thus, it applied to the charitable and religious activities carried out 
by Mrs Lindqvist. 
Finally, the ECJ was asked to pronounce on the question of whether 
it ‘is permissible for the Member States to provide for greater protecti-
on for personal data or a wider scope than is required under Directive 
95/46’. On this issue, the Court stressed that the Data Protection Di-
rective envisages complete harmonisation. Nevertheless, Member States 
enjoy a margin for manoeuvre in certain areas and they are authorised 
to maintain or introduce particular rules for specific situations. In any 
case, they remain free to regulate the areas excluded from the scope of 
application of the Directive, provided that no other provision of Commu-
nity law precludes it.
The two cases cited above illustrate two very important points con-
cerning the jurisprudence of the Court on the Data Protection Directive. 
First, the ECJ refused to follow the Advocate General’s line of reasoning 
and consider fundamental rights (in this case, privacy) as a secondary 
purpose or means for the achievement of the internal market objectives 
of the Directive. Secondly, it also refused to develop a test to establish an 
‘actual’ or ‘sufficient’ link of certain activities to the internal market in or-
der for them to fall within the scope of application of the Data Protection 
Directive. By doing so, it managed to ensure legal certainty and thus safe-
guard and promote the coherence of the internal market itself by ruling 
out any possibilities of uncertainty as to the particular circumstances 
of application of the Directive.39 Hence, despite the criticisms it received 
38 Article 3 (2) lays down the cases that fall outside the scope of application of the Directive. 
39 Bignami (F Bignami, ‘The Case for Tolerant Constitutional Patriotism: The Right to Pri-
vacy Before the European Courts’ (2008) 41 Cornell International Law Journal, 211, 232) 
rightly notes that: ‘It was clear that the Court’s interpretation was driven not so much by 
the text as by the specter of future litigation. If the Court were to hold otherwise and find 
that the Directive applied to only market-related activities, how would future courts distin-
guish between market-related and other activities?’
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for this generous interpretation of the Directive, it is to be commended 
for succeeding in making the ‘successful marriage’ between fundamen-
tal rights and fundamental freedoms, as established by the Community 
legislator in the Data Protection Directive, even more solid and stronger.
3. A difficult task: balancing between fundamental rights
3.1. Privacy versus property: the Promusicae case40
While the Court is to be congratulated on its clear pronouncements 
with regard to the Data Protection Directive concerning the relationship 
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms, its recent 
judgments in Promusicae and Satamedia reveal that it has found it har-
der to deal with cases that concern the relationship between fundamental 
rights themselves.
Let us begin by taking a closer look at the Promusicae ruling, which 
involved the strained relationship between, on the one hand, the right to 
privacy, and on the other, the right to property in the information society. 
The case concerned the refusal of a commercial company which provided 
internet access services, Telefónica, to disclose to Promusicae, a non-
profit-making organisation of producers and publishers of musical and 
audiovisual recordings, acting on behalf of its members who were holders 
of intellectual property rights, personal data of certain persons whom it 
provided with internet access services. Promusicae sought the disclosure 
of the above information before the Commercial Court of Madrid in order 
to be able to bring civil proceedings against those persons who, it alle-
ged, used the KaZaA file exchange program (peer-to-peer) and provided 
access to shared personal computer files with music which the members 
of Promusicae held the rights to. The Spanish Court referred the issue to 
the Court of Justice by asking it essentially whether Community law, in 
particular Directives 2000/31,41 2001/2942 and 2004/48,43 read in the 
light of Articles 17 and 47 of the EUCFR, requires Member States to lay 
down, in order to ensure effective protection of copyright, an obligation to 
communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings. 
40 On the same question, see also the Case C-557/07 LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung 
von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH judgment of 19 Febru-
ary 2009.
41 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178/1.
42 Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
OJ L 167/10.
43 Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157/32.
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The Court commenced its analysis by examining secondary Commu-
nity legislation. It started by taking a look at the provisions of the e-Pri-
vacy Directive44 and found that this does not preclude the possibility of 
Member States laying down an obligation to disclose personal data in the 
context of civil proceedings.45 It then turned to consider the three Direc-
tives mentioned by the national court, the purpose of which is to ensure 
an effective protection of industrial property, in particular copyright in 
the context of the information society. It concluded that these Directives 
did not contain any provisions that would compel Member States to lay 
down an obligation to communicate personal data in the context of civil 
proceedings.46 Since the secondary legislation did not provide any clear 
answer on the issue at stake, the Court turned its attention to primary 
EU constitutional law, namely fundamental rights.
In this part of its analysis, it noted from the outset that while the 
fundamental right to property, which includes intellectual property rights 
such as copyright, and the fundamental right to effective judicial protec-
tion constitute general principles of Community law,47 the situation in 
respect of which the national court put the question at issue involved, 
in addition to these two rights, a further fundamental right, namely the 
right that guarantees the protection of personal data and hence of priva-
te life.48 This is a rather remarkable pronouncement because it was the 
first time that the Court expressly recognised that the right to data pro-
tection enjoys the status of a fundamental right within the Community 
legal order. It did so by looking at Article 8 of the EUCFR, which as seen 
above, expressly proclaims the right to data protection. It seems, though, 
that the ECJ in this case went one step further than its existing case 
law concerning the Charter. Until Promusicae, if a right was contained in 
the Charter, this created a presumption that it was protected under the 
general principles of Community law.49 In Promusicae, however, the fact 
that the protection of personal data was enshrined in the Charter was 
enough for the Court of Justice to identify it as an autonomous funda-
mental right.50 
Notwithstanding this significant development, the Court seemed to 
have a hard time when faced with the challenge of the reconciliation of 
44 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector, OJ L 201/37.
45 Promusicae (n 9) para 58.
46 Promusicae (n 9) para 60.
47 Promusicae (n 9) para 62.
48 Promusicae (n 9) para 63 (emphasis added).
49 See M Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts’, 45 CMLR (2008) 
617, 662.
50  Tzanou (n 26).
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the two fundamental rights, namely the right to respect for private life on 
the one hand and the rights to protection of property and to an effective 
remedy on the other. Its pronouncement on the issue and its answer to 
the national court is contained in a puzzling statement which reads as 
follows:
Directives 2000/31, 2001/29, 2004/48 and 2002/58 do not require 
the Member States to lay down, in a situation such as that in the 
main proceedings, an obligation to communicate personal data in 
order to ensure effective protection of copyright in the context of civil 
proceedings. However, Community law requires that, when transpo-
sing those directives, the Member States take care to rely on an in-
terpretation of them which allows a fair balance to be struck betwe-
en the various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal 
order. Further, when implementing the measures transposing those 
directives, the authorities and courts of the Member States must not 
only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those 
directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an interpre-
tation of them which would be in conflict with those fundamental 
rights or with the other general principles of Community law, such 
as the principle of proportionality.51
What is to be made of this enigmatic pronouncement of the Court? 
Balancing the right to data protection against the right to intellectual 
property is a daunting task and the practical consequences of passing 
the issue back to the national court without providing clear guidelines on 
how a fair balance is to be struck, could prove to be more serious than 
originally envisaged by the ECJ. The Promusicae case leaves a number of 
questions unanswered concerning the obligations of Internet Service Pro-
viders (ISPs) when violations of copyright by their customers using peer-
to-peer technologies are at stake. If every Member State is free to settle 
them independently, then the functioning of the common market is liable 
to be seriously affected by the differences in the national rules applica-
ble to such processing of personal data.52 This is in fact ironic given that 
all of the secondary legislation in this field to date has been adopted on 
the premise of promoting further approximation of the internal market. 
Perhaps what is most significant, however, is the lack of a detailed consi-
deration by the ECJ of the practical consequences of its judgment on the 
fundamental rights themselves. Given the Court’s enhanced commitment 
51 Promusicae (n 9) para 70.
52 As Groussot (X Groussot, ‘Music Production in Spain (Promusicae) v Telefónica de Es-
paña SAU - Rock the KaZaA: Another Clash of Fundamental Rights’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1745, 
1763) has eloquently stressed: ‘The disparities between the legislation of the Member States 
as to liability in civil proceedings endanger the coherence of the internal market. It appears 
clear that the Community legislature and the Court of Justice in Promusicae have not pro-
vided a magic solution for filling those gaps’.
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to fundamental rights in recent years, it is difficult to understand why 
the ECJ failed to foresee the fact that divergent regulations concerning 
intellectual property rights in the internal market might also affect the 
equivalent protection of personal data and of the right to privacy as esta-
blished by the Data Protection Directive. 
3.2. Privacy versus freedom of expression: the case of Satamedia
The Court was also called upon to engage in a balancing of funda-
mental rights in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia. Essenti-
ally, it was asked to interpret Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive, 
which allows Member States to provide for exemptions and derogations 
regarding the processing of personal data ‘carried out solely for journali-
stic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they 
are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing 
freedom of expression’. The case was a preliminary reference made in 
proceedings between the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman, the Tie-
tosuojavaltuutettu, and the Finnish Data Protection Board, the Tietosu-
ojalautakunta, relating to activities involving the processing of personal 
data undertaken by Markkinapörssi and Satamedia. Markkinapörssi had 
collected public data from the Finnish tax authorities53 for the purpose of 
publishing extracts from them in the regional editions of the Veropörssi 
newspaper, and transferred the same data to Satamedia with a view to 
them being disseminated by a text-messaging system. 
The Court, in essence, this time had to reconcile the fundamental 
right to privacy with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. It 
commenced its analysis by noting the importance of the right to freedom 
of expression in a democratic society, and held that notions relating to 
that freedom, such as journalism, should be interpreted broadly. It ob-
served that in order to achieve a balance between privacy and freedom of 
expression, the derogations and limitations of the right to data protection 
must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.54 It then clarified that 
activities, such as those of Satakunnan and Satamedia, which involve 
the processing of data from documents which are in the public doma-
in under national legislation, may be classified as ‘journalistic activities’ 
if their object is ‘the disclosure to the public of information, opinions 
or ideas, irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them’.55 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that these activities are not limited to me-
53 The information contained in these publications comprised the surname and given name 
of approximately 1.2 million natural persons whose income exceeds certain thresholds as 
well as the amount, to the nearest EUR 100, of their earned and unearned income and de-
tails relating to wealth tax levied on them.
54 Satamedia (n 10) para 56.
55 Satamedia (n 10) para 61.
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dia undertakings but cover every person engaged in journalism, and may 
be undertaken for profit-making purposes. However, the Court left it to 
the national court to determine whether this was the case in the main 
proceedings. 
The Court of Justice’s unduly broad definition of journalism in this 
case, which, according to one author ‘is tantamount to declaring that all 
expression must be classified as such’,56 is very problematic. As Oliver 
has eloquently put it, ‘the Court’s open-ended ruling appears to allow 
national courts virtually unfettered discretion in defining the concept of 
journalism’.57 The consequences of such a laissez-faire approach sho-
uld not be underestimated; not only may it hinder the free movement 
of personal data within the European Union, it could also potentially 
result in creating differing standards of protection of the right to privacy 
throughout the Union, especially because the Court again failed to give 
national courts sufficient guidelines to determine how the balance sho-
uld be struck to sufficiently guarantee the right to privacy. Once again, 
one might logically wonder why the Court, which over all these years has 
placed considerable emphasis on the goal of safeguarding the coherence 
of the internal market by guaranteeing equivalent protection for personal 
data across Europe, seems to be endangering the achievement of this 
very goal through its own jurisprudence.
3.3 Tolerating national constitutional diversity: the merits of the 
deferential approach 
It would be wrong to assess the Court’s case law concerning fun-
damental rights by ignoring the fact that the EU itself presents a com-
plex constitutional landscape within which the Union struggles to con-
struct and maintain its own culture and identity while respecting that of 
its Member States.58 Fundamental rights and their balancing are at the 
heart of this constitutional process. One might thus wonder where the 
Promusicae and Satamedia cases are to be placed in this constitutional 
landscape? In other words, how should the constitutional court of the 
European legal order deal with cases that raise ‘tough constitutional que-
stions’, such as the balancing between fundamental rights, in order to 
safeguard its own constitutional identity while at the same time respect 
that of Member States? Is a deferential approach that refers the matter 
back to the national court the best solution in such cases? Does such an 
approach lead to a European culture that is tolerating national consti-
56 P Oliver, ‘The Protection of Privacy in the Economic Sphere before the European Court of 
Justice’ (2009) 46 CMLR 1443, 1461.
57 Oliver (n 56) 1463
58 JA Sweeney, ‘A “Margin of Appreciation” in the Internal Market: Lessons from the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights’ (2007) 34 (1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27.
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tutional diversity? Or does it end up creating more confusion for natio-
nal judges and legislators? What are the implications of the adoption of 
a ‘margin of appreciation doctrine’ in areas heavily regulated by Union 
law? 
One should contemplate these questions in order to understand 
better the ECJ’s deferential approach in Promusicae and Satamedia. The 
merits of a ‘judicial subsidiarity’59 or a ‘margin of appreciation doctrine’ 
- in the words of the European Convention of Human Rights - have been 
emphasised by a number of authors. Starting from the premise that the 
European constitutional order is ‘intrinsically pluralist’,60 they argue that 
any effort to impose a hegemonic belief system in the interest of consti-
tutional patriotism would be ‘antithetical’ to the very character of Euro-
pe.61 Thus, in order to preserve constitutional tolerance, it is imperative, 
according to this theory, that the courts and other law-making institu-
tions permit ‘legitimate disagreement over the content of that identity’.62 
Reading the ECJ’s judgments in Promusicae and Satamedia against 
this background, we can see the merits of the deferential approach. By 
sending the question of the balancing of fundamental rights back to the 
national courts, the Court of Justice avoided having to pronounce aut-
horitatively on a difficult constitutional issue and hence allowed for con-
siderable national discretion. As pointed out by one author, the funda-
mental rights balance between privacy and other rights is ‘by no means a 
precise science’63 and by holding the national courts responsible for the 
balancing, the Court acknowledges that the outcome will differ according 
to each national constitutional culture. In other words, as members of 
the European constitutional order, the relevant national courts are requ-
ired to consider both privacy and the other fundamental right at stake, 
but ‘the accommodation’ of these two fundamental values is to be distinc-
tive to each constitutional order.64 According to this view, it is up to the 
Court of Justice at some time in the future to give a European answer to 
the privacy-other fundamental rights conundrum. However, for the time 
being, the national judge is better placed to resolve such thorny issues 
following his/her national constitutional tradition.65
This deferential approach, albeit with dubious results, is also not 
unknown in cases where the Court has had to decide on public policy 
exceptions to market freedoms. The ‘Sunday-trading’ cases should be 
59 Kombos (n 1) 435.
60 Bignami (n 39) 217.
61 Bignami (n 39) 218.
62 Bignami (n 39) 218.
63 Bignami (n 39) 218.
64 Bignami (n 39) 218.
65 Bignami (n 39) 218. 
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recalled here. In a series of cases starting in the mid-1980s, the Court of 
Justice was called upon by British courts to decide whether local rules 
prohibiting commerce on Sundays were compatible with the duty to allow 
for the free movement of goods under the EC Treaty.66 In what has been 
characterised as one of its ‘most opaque’ judgments,67 the ECJ found 
that such rules could, in principle, be covered by Article 28 of the EC 
Treaty (now 34 TFEU), because they were liable to reduce trade in goods 
among Member States. However, they also ‘reflect certain political and 
economic choices in so far as their purpose is to ensure that working 
and non-working hours are so arranged as to accord with national or 
regional socio-cultural characteristics’.68 The Court left it to the national 
courts to determine whether the restrictive effects of the Sunday trading 
ban exceeded the ‘intrinsic effects’ of the Article 28 EC trade rules.69 The 
case is cited as a positive demonstration of the ECJ’s tolerance for natio-
nal constitutional diversity.70 Nevertheless, the practical consequences of 
the ruling reveal the inadequacy of the Court’s analysis. National courts 
reached conflicting conclusions,71 and the matter was referred by the Ho-
use of Lords back to the ECJ, which finally declared that Article 28 did 
not apply to legislation prohibiting retailers from opening their shops on 
Sunday,72 because the restrictive effects on trade were not excessive in 
terms of the social aim pursued by the legislation.73 
4. Passing the issue to the Member States: why the Court’s deferen-
tial approach is problematic
4.1 Undermining the ‘coherence’ of the internal market?
Despite the merits of the deferential approach, it can be argued that 
by sending the issue to the national courts, the Court of Justice has 
overlooked the possible risk of undermining the coherence of the internal 
market. To better demonstrate this point, we will take a closer look at 
66 The matter was first referred in Torfaen. See Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough Council v 
B&Q PLC [1989] ECR 3851.
67 Barnard (n 1) 132.
68 Torfaen (n 66) para 13.
69 Torfaen (n 66) para 15.
70 Bignami (n 39) 237 notes that ‘these cases demonstrate that on tough constitutional 
questions, like the balance between privacy and expression or between human dignity and 
market rights, the Court of Justice gives precedence to national constitutionalism’.
71 Compare Northcote J in B&Q v Shrewsbury and Atcham BC [1990] 3 CMLR 535 and 
Hoffman J in Stoke-on-Trent City Council v B&Q [1990] 3 CMLR 31 with Allen J in Welling-
borough BC v Payless [1990] 1 CMLR 773 and Mustill J in Smiths-do-it-all v Peterborough 
BC [1990] 2 CMLR 577.
72 Case C-169/91 Stoke-on-Trent & Norwich City Council v B&Q PLC [1992] ECR I-6635, 
para 44.
73 Stoke-on-Trent & Norwich City Council (n 72) para 16.
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the situation created in the Member States regarding copyright infringe-
ments using peer-to-peer technologies in the aftermath of the Promusicae 
ruling. 
The Court’s enigmatic judgment has allowed national legislators to 
display a significant degree of creativity.74 Admittedly, the national solu-
tions are certainly innovative. Nevertheless, such creativity necessarily 
results in divergent solutions in the different Member States and might 
have negative implications for fundamental freedoms and the coherence 
of the internal market. 
Most of the time, national legislatures have opted for a bolstering 
of the role of ISPs in copyright infringement cases.75 A range of propo-
sals that adopt varying roles for ISP holders has therefore been tabled. 
Thus, at the one end, we have the so-called ISP ‘warning system’ solution, 
which is the one essentially set out in the UK’s Digital Economy Bill.76 
According to this, ISPs notify their subscribers if copyright owners have 
reported infringement activity linked to their IP address. The ISPs keep 
track of the number of reports concerning each subscriber and compi-
le an anonymous list of some or all of those who are reported. A court 
order is then sought by the IPR holders to obtain the personal details of 
those concerned so that the IPR holders can initiate proceedings against 
them.77 The Bill also introduces the possibility for courts to require ISPs 
to block access to specified online locations with a substantial proportion 
of content that infringes copyright. In Spain, a new bill that is likely to be 
adopted before July 2010 foresees the creation of a new commission that 
could order the blocking of online services or the withdrawal of infringing 
content from websites. A court order would, however, be needed if funda-
mental rights could be threatened. At the other end, we have the notorio-
us, in terms of fundamental rights, French ‘three strikes’ law. According 
74 Kuner (C Kuner, ‘Data Protection and Rights Protection on the Internet: the Promusicae 
Judgment of the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 30 (5) European Intellectual Property Re-
view 199) argues that: ‘By clarifying that Member States may allow the disclosure of perso-
nal data in civil cases, the Court’s ruling allows the development of innovative mechanisms 
that respect data protection rights, while providing for effective enforcement of property 
rights’ (emphasis added).
75 This point is emphasised by Coudert and Werkers. See F Coudert and E Werkers, ‘In the 
Aftermath of the Promusicae Case: How to Strike the Balance?’ (2010) 18 (1) International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology 50. 
76 Currently at the Committee stage in the House of Lords. See <http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/001/2010001.pdf> accessed 10.5.2010. 
77 Lynskey (Lynskey, ‘The Implications of Copyright Infringement on the Right to Data 
Protection in European Union Law in the Context of Peer-to-peer Technology’, Nottingham 
Conference Proceedings, March 2010) argues that: ‘this solution has the advantage that it 
does not lead to the disclosure of the personal data of the alleged infringers (at least not 
without the safeguard of a court order) yet there is a chance that the infringement will ce-
ase as a result of the communication sent by the ISP. The problem is however that it is not 
guaranteed that the infringement will cease as a result of the ISP’s reminder’. 
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to this legislation, the internet connection of the user would eventually 
be cut off once intellectual property rights had allegedly been infringed 
on three occasions. The law proposed that ISPs would have to inform a 
regulatory body (HADOPI) upon the ‘third strike’ and that this regulatory 
body would then remove the alleged infringer’s connection. This proposal 
(commonly known as ‘Hadopi’) was rejected by the National Assembly 
despite strong government support. It was then accepted by the National 
Assembly on its second reading and also by the Senate, and therefore 
passed into law.78 Other possible solutions to the riddle of balancing data 
protection and intellectual property that provide for the liability of those 
who distribute a product have been suggested in the relevant literature. 
It is outside the purposes of this article to go through every national 
proposal concerning infringement of copyright on the internet after the 
Promusicae case. Suffice it to say that these different national rules ari-
sing from the Court’s deferential approach in Promusicae might distort 
the competition between different ISPs within the EU, and might raise 
obstacles in the exercise of their fundamental freedoms. The same con-
cerns also apply with regard to the recipients of Internet services, ie the 
customers. 
A similar situation might arise from the Satamedia judgment, given 
the uncertainty it has created regarding the scope of Article 9 of the Data 
Protection Directive and the permissible exceptions and limitations to the 
data protection provisions for journalistic purposes. If this scope is to be 
interpreted differently by national courts according to their constitutional 
traditions, then there is a risk that the exceptions and derogations from 
the Data Protection Directive concerning ‘journalistic purposes’ would 
not apply in a similar manner throughout the Union, thus undermining 
the very purpose of the Directive, which is the harmonisation of data 
protection rules in order to remove obstacles to trade. But even if one 
accepts that this will not be the case, the mere confusion caused for 
national judges by the Court’s judgment brings to mind the tragicomic 
situation created in the ‘Sunday-trading’ cases.
4.2 Undermining fundamental rights themselves?
It should be emphasised here that the purpose of the present 
analysis is not to paint a gloomy picture concerning the eventual impact 
of the Court’s judgments in Promusicae and Satamedia on fundamental 
freedoms. In the end, it might (hopefully) be the case that these criticisms 
78 LOI n° 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la créa-
tion sur internet. See <http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3669E0FCB4
D87ED37C2C3517BF5B6BB5.tpdjo11v_1?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000020736830&dateTex
te=20100202> accessed 10.5.2010. 
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are not sufficiently justified in so far as the divergent laws and national 
courts’ decisions produce no more than negligible effects on the coheren-
ce of the internal market. The main purpose is rather to demonstrate the 
implications of these judgments for the fundamental rights themselves. 
These have arisen precisely because the Court chose for its own reasons79 
not to provide a centralised, authoritative decision on the issue of balan-
cing. Unfortunately, here the picture will have to be gloomy.
Let us start by taking a look at the implications for the right to pri-
vacy, and fundamental rights in general, of the national laws adopted in 
the aftermath of the Promusicae case concerning copyright protection on 
the internet. The example of the draconian, in terms of its consequences, 
Hadopi Law lies at the very centre of this gloomy human rights picture. 
The Hadopi Law does not only raise serious concerns regarding the right 
to privacy. In fact, when the law was challenged before the Conseil Consi-
tutionnel, the Court did not hesitate to stress the importance of freedom 
of expression for participation in democratic life, which also includes the 
freedom to access communications services online as a result of the de-
velopment of the internet. The Court held therefore that the power provi-
ded by the law to sanction individuals by restraining or preventing their 
access to the internet as subscribers was incompatible with this right. 
According to the Conseil Consitutionnel, this power to sanction could only 
be exercised by the judiciary. The Court also held that by obliging the 
internet subscriber to prove that an alleged copyright infringement had 
been committed by a third party, the presumption of innocence set out 
in Article 9 of the Declaration was also violated. As a result of these bre-
aches, the Constitutional Court struck down the provisions in the Hadopi 
Law concerned with the imposition of sanctions. 
It is also beyond doubt that the Hadopi Law’s compatibility with 
the right to privacy and the personal data protection of individuals is 
disputable, since the Law essentially introduces a generalised control 
over electronic communications. Similar concerns also apply to the UK’s 
Digital Economy Bill, which provides for the possibility of ISPs to take 
measures to limit the internet access of certain subscribers who are alle-
gedly repeat infringers by capping their bandwidth or shaping it in such 
a way that the subscriber would no longer be able to file-share, or even 
by temporarily suspending their broadband connection. It should be re-
called that Advocate General Kokott noted in Promusicae that ‘it may 
be doubted whether the storage of traffic data of all users without any 
concrete suspicions – laying in a stock, as it were – is compatible with 
79 Above, we read the Court’s deferential approach as a demonstration of its commitment 
to national constitutional diversity. Oliver (n 61, 1483) attributes it to the Court’s ‘eagerness 
to avoid being subsequently wrong-footed by the ECtHR’. 
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fundamental rights’.80 The Article 29 Working Party has also voiced its 
opposition to such a storage obligation, stating that ‘ISPs can[not] … be 
obliged, except in specific cases where there is an injunction of enforce-
ment authorities, to provide for a general “a priori” storage of all traffic 
data related to copyright’. In Promusicae, it seems that the Court of Justice 
side-stepped these considerations by finding that Member States may pro-
vide for exemptions to the confidentiality obligation imposed on ISPs by the 
e-Privacy Directive when it is necessary for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. However, it is arguable whether legislation such as the 
Hadopi Law (and the Digital Economy Bill) passes the test of proportiona-
lity as elaborated by the European Court of Human Rights in its Article 8 
ECHR case law.81
Satamedia is a more recent case and its practical consequences for 
fundamental rights are not entirely visible yet. Leaving aside the fact that 
Finland might be responsible for the incorrect implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive as regards Article 9, in so far as Finnish law in gene-
ral excludes the processing of personal data for purposes of journalism 
or artistic or literary expression in almost every case and not only when 
it is necessary as stipulated by the Directive,82 the fact that the Court 
gives such leeway to Member States in the interpretation of exceptions to 
data protection for journalism might prove problematic. One cannot deny 
of course that the ECJ’s judgment is quite understandable, at least if we 
take into account that it followed the same path in the earlier Lindqvist 
case, where it also had to weight the right to privacy against freedom of 
expression in the context of the conduct of religious activities. The fact 
that in this case the Court sent the issue back to the national court to 
decide was welcomed by certain commentators.83 However, the results 
of Satamedia concerning the right to privacy (or fundamental rights in 
general) still remain to be seen in practice.
5. Conclusions: The ECJ as a new Pythia. How to interpret its 
‘oracles’ in favour of the internal market and fundamental rights?
The present article has examined the consequences for both fun-
damental freedoms and fundamental rights of the ECJ’s judgments in 
the Promusicae and Satamedia cases. It should be noted that a separate 
80 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Promusicae, 18 July 2007, para 82.
81 See, for instance, the Leander v Sweden judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no 116, p 
22, para 48.
82 W Hins, Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia, Judgment of 16 
December 2008, not yet reported (2010) 47 CMLR, 215, 232.
83 Bignami (n 39, 244) notes that: ‘The Lindqvist judgment both affirmed a European com-
mitment to privacy and free expression and made room for diverse moral orderings of public 
life at the national level’.
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assessment of the implications of these cases for the internal market on 
the one hand, and fundamental rights on the other is somewhat artifi-
cial given that both these purposes are inextricably intertwined and in 
any case put on an equal footing in the Data Protection Directive, which 
does not prioritise either of these objectives over the other. However, this 
approach has been advanced for the sake of the clarity of the analysis.
This close relationship between fundamental rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms in the Directive reveals that by not providing a clear answer 
to the balancing of fundamental rights in Promusicae and Satamedia, 
the Court might have endangered both. In this respect, it has been de-
monstrated that different national rules might have implications not only 
for the coherence of the internal market, but also the equivalent level of 
protection of fundamental rights in the enlarged EU. 
 Does this mean that the Court should have settled once and for 
all the issue of the balancing of fundamental rights? Had it opted for this 
solution, it would still have been severely criticised, this time most pro-
bably by national constitutional courts that are keen to safeguard their 
constitutional identity. The present paper regrets, however, the fact that 
the constitutional court of the EU legal order failed to provide clearer gu-
idelines to the national courts. The rationale of the Data Protection Direc-
tive, adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC, is to serve the establishment 
of the internal market by ensuring a high level of harmonised protection 
of a fundamental right. If this project meets with practical difficulties, it 
is the role of the Court of Justice, as the constitutional Court of the EU 
legal order to put ‘more effort into it’,84 instead of leaning backwards and 
passing the ‘hot potato’ to the Member States.
Stressing the importance of the principle of proportionality is not a 
panacea, especially when tough constitutional questions are at stake. 
In the two cases discussed here, one can notice the resemblance of the 
Court’s pronouncements to the oracles of Pythia in ancient Greece. Pyt-
hia was the priestess at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, who sat on her 
tripod seat and delivered enigmatic, equivocal prophesies that could be 
interpreted in many different ways. It seems that the ECJ in Promusicae 
and Satamedia has also left a number of serious issues unanswered for 
national courts and legislators. 
84 Hins (n 82) 231.
